Car Accident

Florida Court Grants Summary Judgment in Favor of Insurer in Motorcycle Crash Case: American Economy Ins. Co. v. Traylor/Wolfe Architects, Inc.

Published on: August 11, 2014 | by Friedman Rodman Frank & Estrada, P.A.

In American Economy Ins. Co. v. Traylor/Wolfe Architects, Inc., a man filed a personal injury lawsuit against an architect and his company following a motor vehicle accident. According to the man’s complaint, he was injured when the architect caused a collision by negligently driving his personal sport utility vehicle into the path of his motorcycle. In his complaint, the man alleged the architecture company was vicariously liable for the architect’s negligent behavior. The doctrine of vicarious liability allows an injured person to hold an employer financially responsible for the negligent acts of a worker if the worker was under the employer’s control at the time and the employee was acting within the scope of his or her work duties.

At the time of the accident, the architect’s company was insured by a business policy. After the lawsuit was filed, the architectural firm’s insurance company filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify the architect or his firm under the terms of the insurance policy. In a motion for summary judgment, a party to a lawsuit asks the court to rule in its favor because no genuine issue of material fact is in dispute and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When a court considers such a motion, the facts of the case are normally viewed in the light that is most favorable to the non-moving party. The injured man opposed the insurance company’s motion, and the Middle District of Florida held a hearing on the matter.

According to the insurer, the architect was not operating the vehicle for a business purpose at the time of the motor vehicle wreck. While reviewing the insurer’s motion, the federal court examined the undisputed facts of the case in order to determine whether the architect was in fact operating his vehicle within the scope of his employment. Although the architect made a business trip to a mobile telephone store prior to the accident, the court found there was no evidence beyond the injured man’s speculation that the architect was using his vehicle for business purposes at the time the collision occurred. The court stated the two trips that the architect took on the day of the accident were separate. In addition, evidence offered to the court indicated the nature of the trip he was taking at the time of the crash was personal. Since the undisputed evidence demonstrated the architect was not operating his SUV within the scope of his employment with his company when he collided with the motorcycle rider, the Middle District of Florida granted the business insurer’s motion for summary judgment and held the insurance company had no duty to defend the architect or his firm.

11th Circuit Says Florida Workers’ Compensation Laws Apply to Temporary Driver Injured in Dump Truck Crash: Wesco Insurance Co. v. Casto

Published on: August 4, 2014 | by Friedman Rodman Frank & Estrada, P.A.

In Wesco Insurance Co. v. Casto, a man sued a Florida company in federal court for personal injuries he allegedly suffered in a collision while driving a dump truck that was owned by the company. In response to the lawsuit, the company sought defense and indemnity from its motor vehicle insurer. The insurance company then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the injured man was an employee at the time of his injury. According to the insurer, the man’s injury was subject to the Floridaworkers’ compensation statute and excluded from coverage pursuant to the terms of the company’s automobile policy. When a party to a lawsuit files a motion for summary judgment, that party is asking the court to rule in his or her favor because no material facts are in dispute and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted the insurer’s motion, and the injured man filed an appeal with the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals.

On appeal, the injured man argued that his harm was not properly subject to the workers’ compensation statute because he was not being compensated for driving the dump truck. Instead, he claimed that he was a volunteer. The man also claimed that the district court committed error when it granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he was a volunteer or temporary worker who was not included under the company’s motor vehicle insurance coverage.

First, the 11th Circuit examined whether the injured man was in fact a volunteer at the time of the dump truck crash. The court stated the relevant inquiry regarding whether a person is a volunteer relates to the expectation of payment for services. Since the injured man testified that he expected to be compensated for driving the dump truck on the date of the accident, and no contrary evidence was offered to the district court, the appellate court held that the man was not a volunteer under Florida law.

Orlando Court Rules on Evidentiary Issues in Bad Faith Insurance Case: Soto v. GEICO Indemnity Co.

Published on: July 29, 2014 | by Friedman Rodman Frank & Estrada, P.A.

The Middle District of Florida in Orlando has refused to allow an automobile insurance company to introduce certain evidence in a bad faith insurance lawsuit. In Soto v. GEICO Indemnity Co., two drivers were involved in a motor vehicle accident in Volusia County, Florida. At the time of the crash, the at-fault driver was insured by GEICO Indemnity Co. Following the traffic wreck, the other motorist sued the at-fault driver and her insurer for damages related to the injuries the plaintiff allegedly sustained in the auto collision. Following a trial before the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in and for Volusia County, the plaintiff obtained a judgment of more than $100,000 against the driver who caused the accident.

The plaintiff later filed a third-party bad faith insurance lawsuit against the at-fault driver’s auto insurance company, alleging the insurer committed bad faith in handling her claim against the other motorist. In Florida, an insurer has a duty to pay a valid insurance claim in good faith and without unreasonable delay. If an insurance company fails to do so, it may be held accountable.

Both parties to the lawsuit reportedly agreed that the only issue at trial was whether the insurer acted in good faith when it handled the plaintiff’s claim against the at-fault driver. Prior to trial, the plaintiff and the insurer filed a number of motions in limine. In general, a motion in limine asks a judge to determine whether certain evidence may be included or excluded before the finder of fact.

Tampa Court Dismisses Case Against Insurer’s Parent Company: Patoo Enterprises, Inc. v. Landmark American Ins. Co.

Published on: July 22, 2014 | by Friedman Rodman Frank & Estrada, P.A.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in Tampa has dismissed a lawsuit that was filed against the parent company of an insurer. In Patoo Enterprises, Inc. v. Landmark American Ins. Co., a licensed transportation broker purchased a commercial liability insurance policy from Landmark American Insurance. In addition to this general liability policy, the company also purchased an umbrella policy from Commerce and Industry Insurance Company. Commerce’s parent company is American International Group, Inc. (AIG). While both insurance policies were in effect, the transportation broker and its parent company were sued following a motor vehicle collision. In response to the lawsuit, the transportation companies filed a claim under both insurance policies. After the insurers denied both claims, the transportation companies filed a lawsuit against Landmark, Commerce, and AIG seeking a declaratory judgment in their favor. AIG then filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit alleging the court lacked jurisdiction against the company and that the transportation companies failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Initially, the federal court stated a motion to dismiss a lawsuit must be viewed in the most favorable light possible to the party who is opposing the motion. Because of this, the court said it is required to assume anything alleged in a complaint is true for purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. According to the court, dismissal is only appropriate where a plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate the party is entitled to relief. Although an AIG employee denied the transportation companies’ claims under the umbrella policy on an AIG letterhead, AIG is a separate company from Commerce. Since AIG did not issue the umbrella policy, the company asserted it should not be required to defend itself despite that the transportation companies argued AIG was a proper party to the lawsuit.

Ultimately, the Middle District of Florida agreed with AIG. According to the court, only Commerce would be required to provide coverage if the transportation companies were entitled to relief under the umbrella policy. Because of this, AIG’s motion was granted and the case against the insurer was dismissed.

Florida Appeals Court Refuses to Order Neurological Exam Absent Good Cause in Negligence Case: Gray v. Richbell

Published on: July 11, 2014 | by Friedman Rodman Frank & Estrada, P.A.

In Gray v. Richbell, a woman was killed when her automobile was rear-ended by another car as she passed a tractor-trailer. The force of the impact apparently caused the woman to lose control of her vehicle and drive into oncoming traffic, where she collided head-on with a truck. Following the fatal motor vehicle accident, the woman’s parents filed a negligence lawsuit against the driver of the truck. According to the woman’s family, the driver negligently failed to avoid the deadly crash. In their complaint, the woman’s parents also claimed that the driver’s age and health contributed to the wreck.

During discovery, an accident reconstruction expert for the parents apparently determined the truck driver caused the fatal crash without actually viewing his medical records. Later, however, the woman’s family was provided with a copy of the driver’s medical records and the opportunity to depose his doctor. Next, the parents asked the trial court to compel the truck driver to submit to a neurological examination. The man objected by stating the woman’s parents failed to demonstrate good cause for the exam as required by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. About one week before trial, a judge held a hearing on the matter and ordered the driver to submit to the examination. Since the neurological examination order was issued only one week prior to trial, the truck driver asked Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeals to review the case and filed a petition to overturn the trial court’s order.

The appeals court granted certiorari in the case because the discovery order was one that could cause “material injury” to the truck driver, and there would be “no adequate remedy on appeal.” The court then examined the requirements of Rule 1.360 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. According to the Fourth District, the rule allows one party to request a medical examination of another only with good cause and where there is a controversy regarding the purported medical condition being examined. Next, the court stated the truck driver’s conduct was the only issue in the case and said the driver’s health was not material to the question of whether or not he committed a negligent act that ultimately led to the traffic collision. Since the woman’s parents failed to demonstrate good cause for their request, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeals granted the truck driver’s petition to prevent a court-ordered neurological examination of him.

Florida Appeals Court Affirms Workers’ Compensation Benefits for Sheriff’s Deputy Injured in a Semi-Truck Crash While Commuting: Levy County Sheriff’s Office v. Allen

Published on: July 9, 2014 | by Friedman Rodman Frank & Estrada, P.A.

Florida’s First District Court of Appeal has affirmed an order granting workers’ compensation benefits to a sheriff’s deputy who was hurt on his way to work. In Levy County Sheriff’s Office v. Allen, a deputy employed by the Levy County Sheriff’s Office for more than 41 years was traveling to work in his personal vehicle when he came upon a stalled semi-truck that was partially blocking one lane of a highway during the early morning hours. Due to the purported unsafe condition, the deputy stated he decided to stop and direct traffic around the big rig despite that he was assigned to provide security services at a local courthouse. The man testified that he also intended to call for additional law enforcement officers to assist him in removing the large vehicle from the highway. Unfortunately, the deputy was unable to stop his vehicle before striking the semi-truck. As a result of the unfortunate collision, the deputy apparently sustained significant personal injuries. At the time of the accident, the deputy was wearing his uniform and carrying both his assigned badge and weapon on his person.

Following the injury accident, the Levy County Sheriff’s Office workers’ compensation insurance carrier refused to pay any benefits to the deputy related to his accident injuries. According to the employer-insurer, the man’s harm did not result from his job duties because he was hurt while commuting to work. In addition, the carrier claimed the man’s harm did not arise out of his employment because his primary work assignment was to provide courthouse security services.

At an evidentiary hearing, both the deputy and several co-workers offered testimony stating Levy County Sheriff’s Office policy requires all deputies to address any obvious safety hazards whether or not they are currently on duty. According to a Judge of Compensation Claims, the deputy’s security assignment did not relieve him of his duty to resolve dangerous conditions such as that posed by the tractor-trailer. Also, the judge found that the man’s injury occurred while he was performing one of his primary job duties. Finally, the judge held that the deputy was “acting within the course of his employment” under Section 440.091(1) of the Florida Statutes. Because of this, the judge ordered that the man’s injury accident was compensable. The employer-insurer then appealed the judge’s decision to Florida’s First District Court of Appeal.

Federal Court in Tampa Remands Bad Faith Auto Insurance Case Back to Pinellas County Court

Published on: July 2, 2014 | by Friedman Rodman Frank & Estrada, P.A.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in Tampa has remanded a personal injury and bad faith automobile insurance case back to state court. In Hall v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., a woman filed a lawsuit in Pinellas County Circuit Court against her automobile insurance company following a collision with an uninsured motorist. In her complaint, the woman asked the court to award her at least $15,000 in damages related to personal injuries she sustained in the traffic wreck. She also accused her motor vehicle insurer of bad faith. After the woman’s lawsuit was filed, the insurance company removed the case to federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction. The woman responded by filing a motion to remand the case back to state court.

Federal law allows defendants in a lawsuit to remove a case to federal court for a number of reasons, including diversity jurisdiction. In order to establish diversity, the parties to a lawsuit must hail from different states and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. Because a plaintiff normally selects his or her desired venue when a lawsuit is filed, a defendant will bear the burden demonstrating that diversity jurisdiction exists. In general, a federal court is required to construe the facts of a case in which diversity jurisdiction is disputed in favor of remand.

According to the plaintiff in the case, the auto insurer failed to establish that the amount in controversy meets or exceeds the statutory requirements. Because of this, the woman argued the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. The insurer countered by claiming a demand letter the plaintiff submitted to the insurer several months before that sought to recover the entirety of her $300,000 automobile insurance policy limits establishes that the she seeks to recover more than $75,000. The Middle District of Florida stated although a settlement offer may be relevant in ascertaining the amount in controversy in a diversity jurisdiction dispute, it is not determinative. Because the woman’s demand letter failed to allege her specific damages and the insurer’s settlement offer of only $12,500 supported the plaintiff’s contention that the amount in controversy was well below $75,000, the federal court ordered that the case be remanded back to Pinellas County.

Limits on Expert Examination at Issue in Unique South Florida Auto Crash Case: Goicochea v. Lopez

Published on: June 26, 2014 | by Friedman Rodman Frank & Estrada, P.A.

In Goicochea v. Lopez, a South Florida woman sued several motorists for injuries she allegedly incurred during three separate motor vehicle collisions that took place between July 2007 and January 2009. According to the woman, the combined lawsuit was necessary because her injuries were so related that it was impossible to reliably apportion damages from each crash. A defendant driver from the second accident asked the purportedly injured woman to submit to examination by a particular doctor of his choosing, pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.360(a)(1)(A). Later, defendants from the first automobile accident requested that the plaintiff submit to an exam performed by a different physician under the same rule. The woman instead sought a protective order that would limit the number of expert examinations she was required to submit to. After the trial court granted her motion, one of the defendants asked Florida’s Third District Court of Appeals to overturn the lower court’s decision.

According to the defendant, the trial court’s decision to limit expert testimony was erroneous and would subject him to harm that could not be repaired on appeal. The appellate court agreed and stated that, unlike the case law relied upon by the trial court, the defendant did not ask the plaintiff to submit to multiple expert examinations related to the same cause of action. Instead, three unrelated defendants with adverse interests were being sued at the same time. The court said the injured woman’s allegations forced each defendant to demonstrate his or her own purported negligence was not the source of the plaintiff’s harm. Florida’s Third District stated the trial court’s limit departed from the “essential requirements” of the law and caused each of the defendants irreparable harm. Because of this, the appeals court overturned the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff was required to submit to examination by only one expert physician.

In the State of Florida, an individual who was hurt in a motor vehicle or other personal injury accident must prove the person or entity that caused his or her injury had a legal duty to exercise reasonable care, failed to do so, and their harm resulted from that failure. For example, a driver has a duty to obey traffic signs and laws. If a motorist speeds excessively and hurts a pedestrian, bicyclist, or another driver in a traffic wreck, he or she likely committed negligence. Depending upon the facts of each situation, proving negligence can be difficult, and establishing the proper evidence at trial is absolutely vital. A skilled South Florida personal injury attorney can help.

Florida Car Accident Case Analyzes Extended PIP Policy Limits: Spaid v. Integon Indemnity Corp.

Published on: June 23, 2014 | by Friedman Rodman Frank & Estrada, P.A.

A Florida appeals court has ordered an automobile insurer to pay all of a car accident victim’s medical expenses pursuant to the terms of the extended personal injury protection (PIP) provision included in her policy. In Spaid v. Integon Indemnity Corp., a woman asked her auto insurer to pay more than $10,000 in medical bills for the injuries she suffered in a 2011 motor vehicle wreck. Although asked to pay all of her medical expenses, the woman’s insurer refused to pay for any medical costs that exceeded her basic PIP policy’s $10,000 limit of liability. In response, the woman filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment against her automobile insurer.

In Florida, motorists are required to maintain $10,000 in PIP accident protection. This insurance allows a driver or other individual to collect up to $10,000 in immediate medical coverage, depending on the type and extent of car accident injury treatment, regardless of fault. Under current Florida law, an individual who was harmed in an automobile collision must seek medical treatment within 14 days of the crash in order to recover under a PIP policy. Typically, a PIP policy will pay for 80 percent of an accident victim’s medical bills up to the policy’s limit of liability. An optional extended PIP policy will normally increase that coverage to 100 percent of an insured’s medical expenses. The question in this case was whether or not the woman’s extended PIP policy incorporated her basic PIP policy’s $10,000 cap.

Before a trial court, the insured woman claimed that the entirety of her medical expenses should be paid because the plain language of her extended PIP policy included no limit of liability. Instead, the declarations page stated “100% Medical,” on the extended PIP line. In contrast, the automobile accident policy expressly limited basic PIP to $10,000 for each person. Because of this, the woman argued the limits of her policy’s extended PIP were ambiguous. The insurance company claimed the optional extended coverage did not change the overall PIP limit of liability. In the end, the trial court sided with the insurer and the woman appealed her case to Florida’s First District Court of Appeal.

$1.1 Million Jury Award in Florida Auto Accident Case Upheld: Zelaznik v. Isensee

Published on: June 19, 2014 | by Friedman Rodman Frank & Estrada, P.A.

The Second District Court of Appeal in Lakeland has affirmed a damages award in a Florida car accident case. In Zelaznik v. Isensee, a woman was injured when her vehicle was rear-ended in an automobile wreck. Prior to trial, the driver who struck the woman’s vehicle apparently admitted fault for the crash but claimed she was not responsible for the woman’s physical harm. Following trial, a jury awarded the injured woman more than $1.1 million in damages. The at-fault driver and her insurance company then appealed the jury’s verdict to Florida’s Second District.

On appeal, the defendants argued the damages award should be overturned as a result of three evidentiary rulings made by the trial court. The defendants claimed that the testimony of an expert witness and a police officer were improperly excluded and a video of the injured woman’s surgery should not have been published to the jury. According to the appeals court, any error committed by the trial court with regard to the excluded testimony was harmless as the jurors were provided with the evidence by other witnesses and there was no reason to believe the jury would likely have returned a different verdict if provided with the testimony.

The Court of Appeal also disagreed with the defendants’ argument that the video was gruesome and only offered to inflame the jury. The court said relevance is the test for whether or not photographic evidence should be submitted to jurors in a trial. Still, Florida law states evidence that may result in confusion, unfair prejudice, or that might otherwise mislead a jury is not admissible. Because the trial judge viewed the 15 minute video excerpt for appropriateness prior to allowing jurors to view it and the defendants offered no evidence that the video was gruesome, the appellate court held there was no abuse of discretion regarding admission of the evidence. Since the trial court did not abuse its discretion and any evidentiary errors were harmless, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the jury’s verdict.